The Bakassi Peninsula appears lost, as far as Nigeria is concerned. It was handed over to Cameroon on August 14, 2008. This followed a complex legal and diplomatic battle marked by an International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling in 2002 and the Green Tree Agreement (GTA) of June 12, 2006. Seventeen years later, the controversy that trailed the handover is yet to abate.
The handover not only altered Nigeria’s geopolitical landscape but also sparked enduring controversies surrounding territorial sovereignty and, critically, oil revenue allocation. The challenges brought about by that development continue to emerge, each time resurfacing like the many heads of a hydra. Just when it seems that one issue is laid to rest, another contention floats, demanding critical attention.
The recent spat between the governments of Cross River and Akwa Ibom regarding the ownership of 76 oil wells along the eastern coastline, which has become a recurring decimal in the revenue pursuits of the two neighbouring states, has brought into the arena the big masquerades that are raising profound dust with their monumental dance steps. They are weighing in on the diplomatic and economic gymnastics that have continued to unveil the hidden trails of the unfortunate episode.
Obong Victor Attah, who was governor of Akwa Ibom State when the final decision to hand over the peninsular to Cameroun, and Etubom Anthony Ani, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in the Abacha regime and a High Chief of Cross River heritage, have recently escalated conversations on matters arising from the venture, which Chief Olusegun Obasanjo was the undertaker, as then Nigerian President.
While Obong Attah, who recently appeared on Channels Television, focused on the ownership of the oil wells, following renewed contention by the Cross River State government, Etubom Ani, in a recent publication, tactically evaded direct intervention on the intra-Nigerian dispute over oil wells. To him, the international legal and diplomatic outcomes on the ownership of the contentious peninsula have narrowed the potency of the internal disagreements. He rather expressed strong indignation over what he termed “the diplomatic and administrative blunder” that resulted in the transfer of the peninsula to Cameroon.
However, Dr. Agwu Ukiwe Okali, a former Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, believes that the haste in the handover was obviously without consideration for the deeper sovereign, diplomatic and social implications. It must have been more of an ego-driven pursuit by Obasanjo.
Before the ICJ ruling, Cross River State was considered a littoral state, possessing direct access to the Atlantic Ocean through the Bakassi Peninsula. This status granted it control over the now-disputed 76 oil wells, a significant source of federal revenue. However, with Bakassi now in Cameroon, Cross River effectively lost its coastline and its claim to these oil wells. As a result, the federal government reallocated the wells to Akwa Ibom State.
This reallocation drastically reduced Cross River’s share of oil derivation revenue, causing considerable dissatisfaction. The state contested the decision in the Supreme Court. However, in 2012, the court ruled in favor of Akwa Ibom, confirming that the petitioner was no longer considered a littoral state and therefore could not claim ownership of the oil wells. Despite this and other interventions, the two states returned to the trenches in the last two months, further escalating the conversation.
Obong Attah has been a prominent voice in this conversation. During the Channels Television interview, Attah reiterated that Cross River’s littoral status was entirely dependent on access to the Atlantic Ocean via Bakassi. The apex court ruling confirmed the loss of that status. That left Cross River landlocked, with only a few islands, and therefore no longer a littoral state.
Attah dismissed any claims that Akwa Ibom owes Cross River compensation for the oil wells, as well as any suggestion of negotiation. “Oil wells are not gifts; they are tied to land. Unless Nigeria’s boundaries are to be redrawn, which is unthinkable, there is no basis for negotiation.” He also dismissed payment of N500 million to Cross River during his tenure, emphasising that legal processes upheld Akwa Ibom’s ownership and left no basis for any form of compensation.
“During my tenure, Cross River went to court hoping to gain oil wells from the ICJ decision. But when the judgment went against them, they withdrew the case. I countersued and insisted that the Supreme Court and the Federal Government uphold the ICJ ruling. The Court affirmed that Cross River is not a littoral state. Oil wells belong strictly to the state in whose territory they fall. Nobody has ever provided proof that Akwa Ibom is drawing revenue from Cross River oil wells. Boundaries decide ownership, not sentiment.” He insisted that by law and geography, Akwa Ibom is entitled to the wells. Obong Attah admitted, however, that he once suggested a political compromise, even proposing that portions could be shared, but Cross River rejected it and chose to rely on the courts. “To now suggest that Akwa Ibom should “dash” Cross River oil wells is like asking Zamfara to give away its gold mines.”
Meanwhile, Etubom Anthony Ani, former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs during the Abacha administration and a High Chief of Cross River heritage, threw up a distinct but critical issue which added a significant layer to the controversy. Rather than engaging directly in the intra-Nigerian oil wells dispute, Ani focused on the broader diplomatic, legal and administrative failures that led to Nigeria’s loss of Bakassi to Cameroon. In a press statement titled “Before the Sun Sets on Bakassi,” he expressed strong indignation over what he called “the diplomatic and administrative blunder” that finalised the transfer.
In the more than 3500-word statement, Ani began by saying that “statesmen who have taken part in fundamental decisions affecting their country seldom write in the press, as they could say things that might jeopardise the very existence of their country. However, where the very existence of the country or a part of it is threatened, then it behoves all statesmen to speak out.” He was therefore constrained to write, at least to put things in proper perspective. The statement, perhaps one of the most comprehensive on the legal tussle, provided a thorough analysis of the government’s actions at the time. It discussed the establishment of a technical committee for coordinating efforts, as well as provision for Plan B, when it became apparent that Nigeria might lose out due to international political dynamics.
Members of the committee included Ani himself, as coordinating minister of Bakassi affairs, Dr. Ajato Amos, Ekpeyong Asuquo, Dr. Yogt (nee Akin Taylor) and Dr. Akiterinwa (both from the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs), Prof. Chukwura, Chief Richard Akinjide, Attorneys-General of the Federation and Cross River State and some senior staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Ani, later the Finance Minister, indicated that Bakassi was historically administered as part of the Akpabuyo Council in Cross River State; even though Akwa Ibom also mounted territorial claims, which he considered weak. He recounts that during the creation of new local councils in 1997, Bakassi was briefly reassigned from Cross River to Akwa Ibom by lobbyists, but was returned to Cross River after his intervention. He, however, explained that the GTA ceded Bakassi, along with its rich oil and gas resources, to Cameroon, effectively depriving both states and Nigeria as a whole of significant oil wealth.
His strongest criticism was directed at Nigeria’s political establishment, which he believes mishandled the case. Ani blames Obasanjo for approving and hastily signing the GTA, without proper Senate ratification, a move he deems unconstitutional and tantamount to the illegal ceding of Nigerian territory. He also singled out Prince Bola Ajibola, who served as Nigeria’s judge advocate at the ICJ and later chaired the commission implementing the ICJ ruling, accusing him of conflict of interest and lacking genuine conviction in defending Nigeria’s case.
According to him, the technical committee recognised that Nigeria had substantial historical and legal evidence to support its ownership of Bakassi. He, however, acknowledged that international politics heavily influenced the ICJ judgment. He believes that Nigeria was caught off guard by the realities of diplomacy – France backing Cameroon, Britain and Germany protecting colonial-era boundaries, and the United States’ opposition due to Nigeria’s pariah status under Sani Abacha’s military regime. In his view, Nigeria’s failure to anticipate this political landscape undercut its preparation and legal defence.
Moreover, Ani lamented the abandonment of “Plan B.” The strategy was approved by General Abacha to establish Bakassi as both “de facto and de jure” Nigerian, by creating the Bakassi Local Government Area (LGA) within Cross River State. After Abacha died in 1998, successive governments prioritised compliance with the ICJ ruling instead, thereby forsaking the political and administrative entrenchment of Nigerian sovereignty over Bakassi. “One thing that I am certain of is that if Gen. Abacha were alive, Nigeria would still occupy Bakassi. Indeed, when Abacha was alive, we had started to implement Plan B, Bakassi Local Government,” he emphasised.
Ani insisted that stronger diplomacy, careful stakeholder inclusion and resistance to hasty ratification of international agreements like the GTA could have preserved Nigeria’s claim. He lamented that after General Abacha’s death and the ICJ ruling, Plan B was undermined by the rapid acceptance of the court’s decision and weak political will. Indeed, he urges a more strategic, sovereign-focused and consultative approach rather than passive acceptance of international judgments that compromised Nigeria’s territorial integrity.
Ani’s position on the hasty handover of Bakassi aligned with that of Dr. Okali, who was equally stunned by the actions of the Nigerian government, particularly Obasanjo. In an article “Bakassi Anniversary Essay: Of lies and Opportunism,” published in Thisday of August 13, 2025, he noted that Nigeria’s actions during that dispensation raised a serious question as to what was really going on and, in particular why the President, who should have put his foot down, was the one pushing the handover, including mounting pressure on the Senate to ratify the GTA he had personally negotiated.
Okali situated Obasanjo’s action in what is generally known of him – putting his ego above national interest. “While one cannot pretend to know Chief Obasanjo’s real motivation in this matter, it would be equally obtuse not to notice that this was a time when his profile as an international statesman and peacemaker was on the rise following his mediation role in political crises in several African countries, and his name was being mentioned in connection with the Nobel Peace Prize and even the Secretary-Generalship of the United Nations. Pulling off a successful and peaceful transfer of Bakassi would be a great opportunity to burnish those statesman and peacemaker credentials. Whether, and if so, to what extent this quest for personal glory was a factor in this whole Bakassi saga, we may never know, but it is an intriguing thought!”
Seventeen years after the handover, the legacy of Bakassi remains fraught with unresolved tensions. The diplomatic, legal and administrative fallout from the transfer continues to impact Nigeria’s internal politics and regional relations with Cameroon. The contentious ownership of the oil wells and the loss of a strategic coastline weigh heavily on the affected states and Nigeria’s national sovereignty. And so, the controversy continues, spewing hydrocarbon and diplomatic fumes.
- Akpandem James is a fellow of the Nigerian Guild of Editors.