History shows that lobbying can transform even military dictators into accepted partners. General Park Chung-hee of South Korea, who seized power through a coup in 1961, became a civilian president with U.S. support after effective diplomacy. Similarly, Nigeria’s late General Sani Abacha maintained cordial relations with Western powers through intensive lobbying, engaging organisations like the Carter Centre and the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE)
LAST July, I spent about two weeks in Washington, D.C., lodged at the historic Mayflower Hotel on Pennsylvania Avenue—just a stone’s throw from the White House. The visit coincided with three major events: the signing of a peace deal between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the M23 militia, America’s Independence Day celebrations on July 4th, and the visit to the White House by five (5) African heads of state.
The U.S. President Donald J. Trump presided over the DRC peace accord aimed at ending a bloody conflict in which the M23 militia—reportedly backed by Rwanda—was accused of fighting to control Congo’s vast mineral wealth, the so-called rare earth resources coveted by the global tech industry.
During the Independence Day celebrations, America projected its military power spectacularly. A B-22 bomber, fresh from destroying Iranian nuclear facilities, performed a low-altitude flyover above the White House. Standing on the lawns with others, I could not help but marvel at the symbolism of America’s unrivaled might.
But beyond the fireworks and military display, the last summer marked an unusual diplomatic moment: President Trump received five African presidents at the White House. Within just 200 days in office, he had met with at least seven, including South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa. It was an unprecedented level of engagement with Africa, signalling a willingness to treat African leaders as individual partners rather than as a faceless bloc.
Trump and Africa: A Different Kind of Engagement
To appreciate this shift, consider that President Barack Obama—the first Black occupant of the White House—hosted several African presidents during his two terms but never as many as Trump did within his first four years (2016–2021). Obama also never visited Nigeria, although he did receive then-President Goodluck Jonathan.
Trump, in contrast, invited and hosted President Muhammadu Buhari in 2020. Historically, only two U.S. presidents—Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton—had both visited Nigeria and hosted our leaders. Most others, including President Joe Biden, had kept their distance. Biden during his one-term tenure, received only two African presidents—Kenya’s William Ruto and Angola’s João Lourenço—but never visited Nigeria.
Trump’s approach, however, went beyond symbolic visits. During his first tenure 2016-2021, he approved the sale of the Super Tucano aircraft to Nigeria to strengthen the fight against Boko Haram and other insurgent groups threatening the nation’s stability.
For perspective, President Obama had denied Nigeria’s earlier request to buy arms, citing the Leahy Doctrine, which bars U.S. arms sales to countries accused of human-rights violations. That denial forced Nigeria to seek weapons through unconventional channels, resulting in the embarrassing 2014 incident in which a private jet loaded with cash and flying out of Nigeria was detained in South Africa while attempting to purchase arms.
Seen in that light, Trump’s willingness to sell weapons to Nigeria was not hostility—it was partnership. Yet, ironically, the same President Trump in his second term has declared Nigeria a “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC) over alleged lack of religious freedom and unacceptable violence against Christians.
How Lobbying Shaped the Narrative
Trump’s decision to sanction Nigeria was reportedly influenced by powerful lobbyists who presented him with a grim picture of Nigeria as a theatre of religious persecution—Christians being slaughtered by Islamist insurgents while the government looked the other way. The narrative gained traction among the influential Evangelical Christian community in the U.S., a key segment of Trump’s political base.
Once that perception took hold, the president was under pressure to act. Due to a lack of a counter-narrative from Nigeria’s side, the U.S. government moved swiftly to categorize Nigeria as a CPC.
This outcome underscores one harsh truth: in international politics, narratives are shaped by those who show up—and Nigeria did not. At the time and to date, the country had no ambassador in Washington, nor was a special envoy appointed to engage the U.S. government or Congress. In the absence of official representation, lobbyists filled the vacuum, influencing policy against Nigeria’s interests.
Had an ambassador been in place, President Trump or then-Secretary of State Marco Rubio could have formally summoned Nigeria’s envoy to express concerns and hear the country’s side of the story. That basic diplomatic process never happened, and Nigeria’s image suffered as a result.
Given that Nigeria is undergoing reforms and President Tinubu has prioritised fixing the economy above other challenges, it is not unexpected that much attention has not been paid to insecurity ravaging the country, hence what appeared to be ambivalence towards insecurity.
But incidentally, President Tinubu had just changed military service chiefs that had been on the job for barely two (2) years and had also just returned from Rome, where he attended a global counter-terrorism meeting, Aqaba. All that was done to boost efforts to restore security. It would appear as if his stepping up security in his scheme of activities came a little late to avert the sanction.
Unfortunately, that is a fallout of the fact that where Nigeria’s voice was needed in the White House and Capitol, there was deafening silence.
Trump’s Bilateral Strategy vs. Africa Summits
Trump’s Africa policy was distinct from that of his predecessors. Rather than gathering dozens of African leaders in one room—as Obama did in 2014 and Biden replicated in 2022—Trump preferred small, direct, bilateral meetings. His goal was to meet as many African heads of state as possible, focusing on one -on – one meetings with leaders of strategic countries like Nigeria, Egypt, Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Africa.
Critics saw this as transactional diplomacy, but in truth, it was a more personal form of engagement. Unlike the large-scale “photo-op” summits where 50 leaders are assembled for general pledges, Trump’s approach allowed for deeper, country-specific discussions.
Nigeria, being one of Africa’s powerhouses, was in line for such a meeting before events elsewhere diverted Washington’s attention. The escalating Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Gaza wars consumed U.S. foreign-policy bandwidth, truncating what could have been a valuable opportunity for Nigeria to clarify its position and rebuild trust.
Lost Opportunities and Diplomatic Lessons
Had that meeting taken place, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu could have corrected misconceptions and defended Nigeria’s image before both the U.S. executive and legislative branches—potentially preventing sanctions and repairing strained relations. But global conflicts thousands of miles away robbed Nigeria of that crucial moment.
The episode offers a sobering lesson: in modern geopolitics, lobbying is diplomacy by other means. Nations that fail to invest in strategic communication risk being defined by others. In Washington, perception is power—and those who can shape it wield influence far beyond their borders.
For Nigeria, the takeaway is clear. We cannot afford diplomatic inertia, especially in an era where advocacy groups and lobbyists can alter global narratives overnight. Effective representation, both at the ambassadorial and legislative-liaison levels, is not optional—it is essential to defending national interests abroad.
Indeed, as the Trump-Nigeria saga illustrates, what lobbying cannot do simply does not exist.
To underscore the supremacy of lobbying in diplomacy, I have replaced the word “God” in the popular slogan “What God cannot do does not exist” with “lobbying.” Indeed, in international relations, what lobbying cannot do does not exist.
It is this belief that fuels my optimism that the brewing diplomatic tension between President Donald Trump and Nigeria—following his recent redesignation of the country as a “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC) for religious persecution—can be resolved. If properly deployed, lobbying can calm the storm before it becomes a diplomatic disaster.
A useful case study is Pakistan under General Pervez Musharraf. After 9/11, Musharraf cleverly positioned Pakistan as an indispensable ally to the West. Through persuasive diplomacy, he emphasized Pakistan’s strategic role in regional stability and counterterrorism. Despite his military background and human rights record, lobbying helped Musharraf secure massive U.S. and U.K. support.
By contrast, Nigeria under President Bola Tinubu has yet to cultivate a close rapport with President Trump or key U.S. lawmakers and Secretary of State Senator Marco Rubio. But it is not too late. As Pakistan’s example shows, deliberate diplomatic outreach and professional lobbying can turn strained relationships into strategic partnerships.
Recent comments by U.S. Congressman Ben Cline of Virginia underline the urgency. He warned that “all options are on the table” regarding Nigeria’s religious crisis—even military action—but added that if Nigeria works with the U.S., the episode could lead to “a stronger relationship between our countries.” That is an opening Nigeria must seize.
History shows that lobbying can transform even military dictators into accepted partners. General Park Chung-hee of South Korea, who seized power through a coup in 1961, became a civilian president with U.S. support after effective diplomacy. Similarly, Nigeria’s late General Sani Abacha maintained cordial relations with Western powers through intensive lobbying, engaging organisations like the Carter Centre and the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE).
In the democratic era, President Olusegun Obasanjo also mastered the game. With seasoned lobbyists in Washington—such as former Atlanta mayor Andrew Young, Rev. Jesse Jackson, and cultural scholar Dr. Maulana Karenga, and even Carl Masters, a Washington aficionado working for Obasanjo, Nigeria regained international credibility and secured the historic debt forgiveness from the Paris Club and the World Bank.
That tradition of strategic engagement seems to have waned. Nigeria currently lacks an ambassador in Washington and a permanent representative at the UN, leaving a dangerous vacuum in the global conversation. In a city where influence defines power, silence is costly.
That is why when lobbyists filled President Trump’s ear with horrific narratives of Christian persecution, Nigeria’s counter-narrative was absent. The result was predictable: on October 31, Nigeria was redesignated a CPC, followed by Trump’s threat of “kinetic military action.” That declaration sent shivers down the spines of many Nigerians, haunted by memories of past U.S. interventions in Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan.
The irony is that the alleged religious killings in Nigeria cut across all faiths—Christians, Muslims, and animists alike, even though Christians in the Middle Belt are making the case that the killings are particularly skewed against them. Yet, in Washington, perception often becomes policy unless contested through effective advocacy. The absence of Nigeria’s voice at the table allowed a one-sided story to shape a damaging outcome.
Washington, D.C. is the lobbying capital of the world. From Capitol Hill to the 100-year-old Mayflower Hotel near the White House, lobbyists shape legislation, trade policy, and foreign relations daily. No serious government can afford to ignore that reality.
To rebuild trust with the Trump administration and repair Nigeria’s image, the Tinubu government must urgently revive a structured lobbying framework anchored on these key actions:
- Engage in Dialogue: Initiate high-level discussions with U.S. officials to clarify Nigeria’s commitment to religious freedom and democracy.
- Address Security Challenges: Strengthen and retool the armed forces to tackle terrorism, banditry, and communal violence.
- Promote Religious Tolerance: Discourage incendiary rhetoric by religious leaders and promote interfaith dialogue.
- Reinforce International Partnerships: Collaborate with global allies on humanitarian aid, capacity building, and development programs.
- Appoint Competent Envoys: Restore Nigeria’s presence in Washington and New York with capable diplomats who understand both policy and persuasion.
To underscore the importance of envoys, President Trump engaged Steve Witkoff to serve as his Arab and Middle East envoy to negotiate the end of the Israel/Hamas and Russia/Ukraine wars despite the existence of US ambassadors in those countries.
It is by taking the steps recommended above that Nigeria can show its commitment to stability and demonstrate that it remains a reliable ally of the United States.
In the interim, President Tinubu is set to announce the appointment of ambassadors to fill the void in the diplomatic space waiting to be closed. A paucity of funds to operate Nigeria’s diplomatic posts may be one of the reasons diplomacy was not in a prime position on Tinubu’s To-Do List.
Without it being on the front burner, it was easy for diplomacy to be frozen. But the recent N1.15 trillion budget support funds recently approved by the National Assembly for Tinubu may facilitate the reactivation of Nigeria’s diplomacy with boots on the ground metaphorically in our numerous diplomatic posts,
In the final analysis, lobbying is not manipulation—it is the art of persuasion guided by national interest. History has shown that it can restore broken relationships, reshape narratives, and even transform regimes once considered pariahs into partners.
If Pakistan and South Korea could do it, and if Abacha and Obasanjo once leveraged it to Nigeria’s advantage, then President Tinubu can also use it to mend fences with Washington.
In truth, when it comes to diplomacy and international relations, what lobbying cannot do does not exist.
- Magnus Onyibe, an entrepreneur, public policy analyst, author, democracy advocate, development strategist, and alumnus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Massachusetts, USA, is a Commonwealth Institute scholar and a former commissioner in the Delta State government. He sent this piece from Lagos.