Nigeria’s economy will be experiencing yet another round of reform; after the new tax implementation, the banking sector recapitalisation exercise will begin within less than three months until the March 31, 2026, deadline. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Governor, Olayemi Cardoso, disclosed that 27 banks have tapped the capital market via public offers and rights issues.
The figures show that of 21 the 37 commercial, merchant, and non-interest banks in the country have met or exceeded the revised minimum capital thresholds of N500 billion for internationally authorised banks, N200 billion for national banks, N50 billion for regional banks, and N10-20 billion for non-interest banks. With the developments above, policymakers are betting that stronger balance sheets will help banks withstand macroeconomic shocks, finance growth, and restore confidence in the financial system. On the surface, the logic is sound, capital matters. But history warns us that capital alone is not a cure-all.
Nigeria has been here before, going by the 2004-2005 era of the then-governor of CBN, Charles Soludo, whose banking consolidation dramatically reduced the number of banks from 89 to 25 and created national champions. Yet barely five years later, the system was back in crisis, requiring regulatory intervention, bailouts, and the creation of the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) to absorb toxic assets. The lesson here is clear, which revealed that recapitalisation that ignores structural weaknesses merely postpones failure.
If the current exercise is to succeed, the CBN must use it not only to raise capital but to repair the deeper fault lines that have long undermined the stability, credibility, and effectiveness of Nigeria’s banking sector.
More Capital isn’t Always Better Capital
The first and most critical issue is the quality of capital being raised. Disclosures made by the banks have shown that the combined capital base of about N5.142 trillion is already locked in by lenders across the different licence categories. Bigger numbers on paper mean little if the capital is not genuinely loss-absorbing. In past recapitalisation cycles, concerns emerged about funds being raised through related parties, short-term borrowings disguised as equity, or complex arrangements that ultimately recycled the same risks back into the system.
This time, the CBN must insist on transparent, verifiable sources of capital. Every naira raised should be traceable, free from conflicts of interest, and capable of absorbing real losses in a downturn. Otherwise, recapitalisation becomes an accounting exercise rather than a resilience-building one.
Why Corporate Governance Remains the Achilles’ Heel
Perhaps the most persistent weakness in Nigeria’s banking sector is corporate governance failure. Many bank crises have not been caused by macroeconomic shocks alone, but by poor board oversight, insider abuse, weak risk culture, and excessive executive power.
Recapitalisation provides a rare regulatory leverage point. The CBN should use it to reset governance standards, not just capital thresholds. Boards must be independent in substance, not just in form. Being one of the critical aspects of the banking challenge, insider lending rules should be enforced without exception. Risk committees in every financial institution must be empowered, not sidelined by dominant executives.
Without the apex bank fixing governance, new capital risks become fresh fuel for old excesses.
The Unresolved Burden of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs)
Data from the CBN’s latest macroeconomic outlook showed that the banking industry’s Non-Performing Loans ratio climbed to an estimated 7 percent, pushing the sector above the prudential ceiling of 5 percent. Nigeria’s banking sector continues to be drowned with high volumes and recurring non-performing loans (NPLs), and this is often concentrated in sectors such as oil and gas, power, and government-linked projects. Though with the trend of events, one may say that regulatory forbearance has helped maintain surface stability in the sector, no doubt it has also masked underlying vulnerabilities.
The truth is that a credible recapitalisation exercise must confront this reality head-on. Loan classification and provisioning standards should reflect economic truth, not regulatory convenience. Banks should not be allowed to carry impaired assets indefinitely while presenting healthy balance sheets to investors and the public.
Transparency around asset quality is not a threat to stability; it is a foundation for it.
How Foreign Exchange Risk Quietly Amplifies Financial Shocks
Few risks have damaged bank balance sheets in recent years as severely as foreign exchange volatility. Many banks continue to carry significant FX mismatches, borrowing short-term in foreign currency while lending long-term to clients with naira revenues.
During periods of FX adjustment, these mismatches can rapidly erode capital, no matter how well-capitalised a bank appears on paper. Recapitalisation must therefore be accompanied by tighter supervision of FX exposure, stronger disclosure requirements, and realistic stress testing that assumes adverse currency scenarios, not best-case outcomes.
Ignoring FX risk is no longer an option in a structurally import-dependent economy.
Concentration Risk and the Narrow Credit Base
Another long-standing weakness is excessive concentration risk. A disproportionate share of bank lending is often tied to a small number of large corporates or government-related exposures. While this may appear safe in the short term, it creates systemic vulnerability when those sectors face stress.
At the same time, the real economy, particularly SMEs and productive sectors, remains underfinanced because, over the years, Nigeria’s banks faced significant concentration risk, particularly in the oil and gas sector and in foreign currency exposure, while grappling with a narrow credit base characterised by limited lending to the private sector. This is due to high credit risk and tight monetary policy. Owing to this trend, recapitalisation should therefore be in alignment with policies that encourage credit diversification, improved credit underwriting, and smarter risk-sharing mechanisms, and not the other way round.
Therefore, it will be right to say that banks that grow larger but remain narrowly exposed do not strengthen the economy; they amplify its fragilities.
Risk Management in a Volatile Economy
The recurring inflation shocks, interest-rate swings, fiscal pressures, and external shocks are frequent features, not rare events, which show that Nigeria is not a low-volatility environment.
Currently, the Nigerian banking sector’s financial performance and investment returns are equally affected by various risks, including credit, liquidity, market, and operational risks.
Today, many banks still operate risk models that assume stability rather than disruption. Time has proven that risk management is essential for mitigating these risks and ensuring stability and profitability.
The apex bank must ensure that the recapitalisation process mandates robust, Nigeria-specific stress testing, and banks must demonstrate resilience under severe but plausible scenarios. This includes sharp currency depreciation, interest-rate spikes and sovereign stress. It must evolve from a compliance function to a strategic discipline.
Transparency and Financial Reporting