Why Trump’s Abraham Accords push has left Islamic nations in a tight spot

United States President Donald Trump’s wants to expand the Abraham Accords along with the ongoing peace deal negotiations with Iran.

On May 25, Trump revealed that he had spoken with the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain regarding a broader diplomatic framework tied to ending the ongoing conflict involving Iran.

During those conversations, Trump urged several Muslim-majority nations to formally join the Abraham Accords — the US-brokered agreements that normalised ties between Israel and a number of Arab countries beginning in 2020.

“I am mandatorily requesting that all Countries immediately sign the Abraham Accords, and that, if Iran signs its Agreement with me, as President of the United States of America, it would be an Honor to have them also be part of this unparalleled World Coalition,” Trump wrote on Truth Social.

Trump also stated that he appreciated “all the work done by the United States to try and pull this very complex puzzle together.”

He later added that while “one or two” countries may have reasons for hesitating, most nations should be “ready, willing, and able to make this Settlement with Iran a far more Historic Event than it would, otherwise, be.”

Two days later, Trump
reinforced his stance again while speaking about the issue. “We’re, you know, requesting strongly that they join,” Trump said.

However, instead of generating momentum for some dramatic breakthrough, the proposal has largely been
met with silence or outright rejection.

Pakistan publicly rejected the idea. Other countries
avoided directly endorsing the proposal, while regional analysts described the plan as detached from the current political realities shaping West Asia.

What are the Abraham Accords?

The Abraham Accords represented one of the most consequential diplomatic developments in modern West Asia when they were announced in 2020 during Trump’s first term in the White House.

For decades, Arab states had broadly adhered to the framework established by the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. That initiative conditioned normalisation with Israel on the establishment of an independent Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders.

The Abraham Accords altered that long-standing regional consensus. Instead of waiting for a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the United States promoted direct bilateral partnerships between Israel and several Arab and Muslim-majority states.

The framework focused on economic cooperation, security coordination, technology partnerships and strategic alignment.

The agreements were also influenced heavily by concerns regarding Iran’s regional influence and military posture.

The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain became the first Arab countries in more than two decades to establish formal diplomatic ties with Israel under the framework in 2020. Morocco and Sudan later followed with their own normalisation arrangements.

The accords were viewed at the time as a major diplomatic success for Washington because they bypassed a conflict that had historically stalled wider Arab-Israeli engagement.

The structure relied on what regional analysts described as an “outside-in” approach — building Arab-Israeli cooperation first in hopes that it could eventually create momentum for resolving the Palestinian issue later.

By 2025, the framework had continued evolving. Non-Arab Kazakhstan formally acceded to the declaration in late 2025, making it one of the more recent additions connected to the broader framework.

Meanwhile, following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria in December 2024, discussions also emerged during 2025 regarding Syria’s potential future integration into the accords structure.

Yet despite those developments, the regional atmosphere surrounding Israel changed dramatically after its wars in Gaza and Lebanon materialised.

The environment that allowed the accords to gain traction in 2020 no longer exists in the same form.

Why has the war in Gaza become the biggest obstacle to normalisation?

The single largest reason behind opposition to Trump’s proposal is the humanitarian and political fallout from Israel’s military campaigns in Gaza and Lebanon.

Across the Arab and Muslim world, public opinion has hardened sharply against Israel following the destruction and civilian casualties caused by the conflicts over the last two years.

As per latest data, rhe Palestinian death toll in Gaza had reportedly crossed 70,000. The scale of destruction has been visible daily across television broadcasts and social media platforms throughout the Muslim world.

At the same time, the conflict in Lebanon expanded significantly. Israeli ground operations and airstrikes in southern Lebanon reportedly devastated numerous villages, displaced large populations and contributed to the creation of a controversial security zone south of the Litani River.

According to the information provided in the reports, at least 815,000 Lebanese civilians were displaced and prevented from returning to their homes.

For governments across West Asia and broader Muslim-majority countries, the political consequences of formally recognising Israel during such a period are viewed as potentially destabilising.

Regional leaders fear that entering into normalisation agreements now could be perceived domestically as abandoning Palestinians and Lebanese civilians amid ongoing destruction.

This concern applies not only to countries that have never recognised Israel, but also to states that already maintain diplomatic ties with it.

The wars have therefore pushed the Palestinian issue back to the centre of regional politics after years in which some Gulf states had attempted to deprioritise it in favour of economic modernisation and strategic security partnerships.

Analysts have argued that the sheer scale of civilian casualties and displacement has fundamentally changed the political calculus surrounding normalisation.

The original Abraham Accords emerged during a period when several Gulf governments viewed Iran as the primary regional threat and considered security coordination with Israel strategically useful.

By contrast, the current political climate is dominated by public outrage over Gaza and Lebanon.

Why is Saudi Arabia refusing to join the accords?

As the birthplace of Islam and custodian of the two holiest sites in Islam — Mecca and Medina — Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic decisions carry enormous political and religious significance across the Muslim world.

For years, Riyadh has maintained that normalisation with Israel depends on progress toward Palestinian statehood. That position did not change after Trump’s latest proposal.

According to the reports, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has consistently linked any recognition of Israel to the principles of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative.

Saudi Arabia continues to insist on what was described as a “clear, irreversible path” toward an independent Palestinian state.

Regional analysts also noted that the kingdom faces heightened public sensitivity over Gaza because of the visibility of the humanitarian crisis across Arab media. Under such conditions, entering a highly publicised normalisation agreement with Israel could expose the Saudi leadership to severe domestic criticism.

Saudi Arabia for now has restored diplomatic ties with Iran through Chinese-mediated negotiations, reflecting a broader Gulf preference for de-escalation rather than confrontation.

This means Riyadh no longer sees participation in an anti-Iran regional bloc as strategically necessary in the same way it once did.

Why did Pakistan reject Trump’s proposal?

Islamabad
has historically maintained that it will not recognise Israel until a viable two-state solution addressing Palestinian statehood is achieved.

According to the reports, Pakistani officials viewed Trump’s demand as incompatible. The Pakistani passport
continues to carry the inscription: “This passport is valid for all countries of the world except Israel.”

Travel between the two countries remains prohibited for most citizens, and there are no direct trade or postal links.

Any attempt at normalisation remains a “red line” for the Pakistani public and the powerful military-intelligence apparatus, especially given the current humanitarian situation in the Palestinian territories.

Why does Qatar fear losing its neutrality?

Qatar’s position differs from several other countries involved in the discussions because Doha occupies a highly specialised diplomatic role within the region.

Qatar hosts political offices connected to multiple regional factions and has frequently served as a mediator between Western governments, Iran and Palestinian groups.

The country has also played a major role in facilitating sensitive negotiations and backchannel diplomacy directly between Washington and Tehran.

According to the reports, Qatari officials and regional observers fear that formally joining the Abraham Accords could damage Doha’s carefully cultivated reputation as a neutral intermediary.

If Qatar were to openly align itself within a normalisation framework involving Israel, it could lose credibility with several actors that currently rely on it as a trusted communication channel.

Why are Egypt, Jordan and Turkey considered diplomatic redundancies?

Another major issue with Trump’s proposal is that several countries named by him already maintain diplomatic relations with Israel.

Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, becoming the first Arab country to formally recognise the Israeli state.

Jordan followed in 1994 through its own peace agreement. Both countries have maintained diplomatic, military and intelligence coordination with Israel for decades.

Turkey also recognised Israel in 1949, making it the first Muslim-majority country to do so.

Because of these existing relationships, analysts described Trump’s demand that they join the Abraham Accords as diplomatically redundant.

There would be little practical gain from formally placing these countries into a newer US-brokered framework when official ties already exist. At the same time, joining the accords publicly under current regional conditions could expose those governments to significant domestic political risks.

Egypt and Jordan already face intense public anger over the Gaza war. Both governments have maintained relations with Israel while simultaneously confronting rising pressure from populations angered by the humanitarian situation in Gaza.

Turkey’s relations with Israel have deteriorated sharply under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, particularly over military operations in Gaza and Lebanon. Analysts cited in the reports described any public normalisation initiative involving Ankara at this stage as politically unrealistic.

How have existing Abraham Accords members reacted?

According to the reports, several existing signatories have quietly reduced visible forms of cooperation with Israel amid growing domestic pressure.

The UAE and Morocco, while maintaining formal diplomatic ties, have reportedly become more cautious regarding overt public alignment with Israel. Public support for the accords has fallen sharply in these participating countries because of anger over Gaza and Lebanon.

Regional anger has also escalated because of broader Israeli military actions beyond Gaza.

Following the collapse of Assad’s government in Syria, Israel conducted border operations and created security zones that some neighbouring states viewed as destabilising.

Under this phenomenon, countries maintain formal diplomatic ties with Israel for strategic or economic reasons while simultaneously minimising public displays of cooperation to avoid domestic backlash.

Why has linking the accords to Iran negotiations become controversial?

Linking separate diplomatic tracks like the Abraham Accords unnecessarily complicates already fragile negotiations.

Several Gulf countries support reducing tensions with Iran because regional instability threatens shipping routes, energy infrastructure and broader economic security. The Strait of Hormuz remains particularly critical because of its importance to global energy markets.

At the same time, these governments do not necessarily want to join an overt anti-Iran bloc centred around Israel.

Back in 2020, Gulf states and Israel shared strong concerns regarding Iran’s regional posture and military activities. But now, Gulf governments increasingly prefer de-escalation with Tehran.

Experts have argued that Trump misread current alignments within West Asia. Publicly pressuring countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar risks
placing key US regional partners in politically difficult positions.

The core structural flaw of this en masse demand is needless over-complication.

While all of these nations intensely desire an end to the active war with Iran to stabilise their economies, safeguard infrastructure, and reopen the vital Strait of Hormuz shipping lanes, they reject the premise that they must unconditionally align with Israel to get it.

With inputs from agencies