The BRICS group—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—has uniquely emerged as a geopolitical player. Since its establishment, it has transformed into an informal association, struggling to re-shape the global architecture. Noticeably the world is rapidly changing from rules-based unipolar to multipolar, which can be attributed to BRICS leadership. Under Russia’s chairmanship, it had seen several activities throughout 2024, and currently Brazil, despite escalating challenges rooted at home, still managed through with innovative strategies and with robust multilateral collaborations. Brazil hands over its presidency in July (from Jan. 2025 to July 2025) after taking the baton during the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Tatarstan. Comparatively Kazan witnessed more engaging BRICS programmes and activities, both from the public and private sectors, than under Brazil’s half-a-year (six-months) leadership. The was, historically, the first time in terms of leadership duration.
At the request of Brazil, Russia headed BRICS in 2024. Brazil had proposed and Russia assumed this role in 2024. In turn, Brazil leads, but only half-way into the chairmanship in 2025. “Brazil has formally asked Russia to change the order of the BRICS presidency as an exception to Brazil’s plans to lead the G20 in 2024. Of course, we have responded positively to the Brazilian partners’ request. The agreement was supported by other members of the bloc and secured through an exchange of diplomatic notes,” the Russian ministry explained at that time.
Under Russia in 2024, significant developments, in the first place, was the expansion of BRICS, with the inclusion of Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, and United Arab Emirates. And the re-titling BRICS+ (BRICS Plus). Reports indicated that over 30 countries were interested in joining BRICS. Russia’s chairmanship emphasized advancing multifaceted cooperation, promoting the idea of a unified BRICS financial system and a new digital currency to rival the US dollar. Despite a few controversies, the group adopted the final declaration.
In an entirely different geopolitical context, Brazil’s presidency of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) abruptly ends in July due to multitude of internal economic and political hurdles that need to smart attention. After making unique headlines these past months, Brazil indicated the necessity to undertake explicit blend of economic reforms to preserve its political status and adopt grassroots innovation to save further nation-wide depreciation. The negative economic narratives combined with an increasing social discontent among the population also show the growing political complexities on its landscape. The assertive, and at the same time, contradictory message relates to disillusionment over unexpected handing over of BRICS chairmanship midway of the scheduled one-year period and the scaling back of admirable tasks including development priorities and future policies for BRICS set at the end of its historic administration by Russia in December 2024.
With tectonic symbolism, Brazil took over, for the fourth time, the baton of BRICS chairmanship from January 2025, pledged to assertively work towards a broader equitable economic cooperation. The leadership rotates annually among member countries. It is done in a set order, promoting equal representation and participation. The leadership transition is significant for shaping the agenda and priorities of the group. Brazil, like other BRICS members, repetitively spoken to end dollar dominance, create a single BRICS currency, express passion for dealing with critical challenges and build a multipolar world. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, both in tone and policy approach, have made a few changes, rolled back the association’s aggressive promotion of its laid down posture in building strategic common objectives.
For the past six months, Brazil at the helm of BRICS, has observed the ‘status quo’ – leveraged on the traditional main stream of operations including pushing for reforms in global governance and made attempts, mostly with official rhetoric, promoting sustainable development. Right from the initial stage, this ambitious agenda raised a fundamental question: whether the alliance would advance its alternative global governance vision, or would it remain primarily a forum for economic cooperation Recollecting the facts in the documents, one particular focus was set at strengthening cooperation among Global South countries. Under the theme is “Strengthening Cooperation in the Global South for More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance”, Brazilian leader, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has pursued various activities within the existing constraints. In the latest, and most possibly, the last activity, as part of steps toward July’s handover, Brazil hosted from June 30 to July 7 one key event BRICS+ Open Science Week, — the Decade of Science and Technology declared by President Vladimir Putin in Russia. It was within the framework of the federal project Popularization of Science and Technology of the Scientific and Technological Development of the Russian Federation State Programme. The project aimed at promoting scientific and technical knowledge among the general public and helping people discover the wonderful world of science and establish a community of science popularizers. The main themes relate to the priority spheres of BRICS activities, namely, food security and agriculture, energy security and sovereignty, healthcare, sustainable development, AI technologies, and space exploration.
As stipulated in its documents, BRICS has set one more of the primary goals as counteracting rules-based order and western hegemony, dismantle the political and economic architecture of the United States and Europe. The group’s remarkable growing attraction and unwavering commitment to reshaping the global economic landscape offer the basis for south-south alliance. At, least, majority of the developing countries in the south are, more or less, rattles that rhetoric in theory, but in practical terms are seemingly ready to strengthen cooperation with United States and Europe.
The Global South have devoted extensive attention to food security issues, underlined cooperation with non-Western countries as a guarantors of food stability. Experts however emphasized this goal of ensuring food security is rather distinctively marked by food imports, especially developing countries including Africa. Sustainable alliances and new principles of cooperation are emerging, but developing countries are trapped in the multilateral financial networks such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.
Reading further through media reports in June, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has outlined comprehensive future vision for BRICS, sounded consistently optimistic over collective collaboration based on mutual interests and equality, contrasting it with Western organizations lacking fair rules and genuine consensus. Then also the establishment of a BRICS Pay system for settlements in national currencies between the group’s members represented one more step in its economic architecture. This includes the possibility of creating a cross-border payment system and an electronic depository and clearance system (BRICS Clear), and a unified mechanism for exchanging trade and economic information.
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has his own interpretation to BRICS expansion. He advocated for a little pause in further expansion, in order to accommodate the work and the new composition of BRICS − so that the group can smoothly get into the new situation with increased membership. According to Lavrov this was the common opinion. “The aspirations of many countries were taken into account when the category of partner countries was established and it is understood that the partner countries would be priority candidates for full membership,” explained Lavrov, summing up the outcomes of the BRICS Foreign Ministers Council meeting, Rio de Janeiro, April 29, 2025.
At the Kazan summit, BRICS leaders emphasized the possibility of expanding the membership of the New Development Bank (NDB). They also proposed bank’s operational portfolio. The NDB has transformed into an institution for mobilization of resources for infrastructure and sustainable development in its member countries and other emerging economies. The NDB has made some impact, but there is much room for improvement and for strengthening its model of operations.
The latest developments concerning the NDB’s operations were discussed on the sidelines of the St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in June 2025. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a working discussion with Dilma Rousseff, President of the New Development Bank (NDB). That discussion pointed out a few challenges and, at the same, underlined the pathways into the future. According to official reports made available by the Kremlin, Putin urged the bank to consider seriously the adoption of new financial payment systems and the possibility of settlements in national currencies. Putin further underlined the state of operations, stated that the NDB has, so far, financed approximately 120 projects worth US$39 billion.
Established in 2015 by the BRICS leaders, the New Development Bank (NDB) has since faced multitude of challenges, especially now with geopolitical changes and emerging economic hurdles. “Of course, we face a number of challenges,” Dilma Rousseff replied in her brief response. Rousseff, in addition, referred to the second very important issue, that is the expansion of membership and stakeholders, partners of the bank. As at June 2025, two countries were selected as new members: Uzbekistan and Colombia. And two more countries are still under consideration: Ethiopia and Indonesia.
According to media reports, other multilateral development institutions, including the World Bank, have expressed an intention to work together with the NDB. In May 2023, Saudi Arabia expressed its intention to join the NDB. The bank is headquartered in Shanghai, China. The first regional office of the bank was opened in Johannesburg, South Africa in 2016. Subsequently, regional offices were established in São Paulo in Brazil, Ahmedabad in India and Moscow in the Russian Federation.
Its historical records show that Brazil, Russia, India, and China held their first leaders’ summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in June 2009 under the name BRIC. Then South Africa joined the group in 2010. That however, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates were invited to the 2024 summit in Russia. With the second expansion in Kazan, the acronym BRICS+ (in its expanded form BRICS Plus) is currently used reflecting newly transformed membership. In addition, it has 13 countries in the ‘partner state’ category, boosting its numerical strength and collective power.
Unbelievably the potential of BRICS has benefited greatly from expansion. The BRICS countries represent nearly half of the world’s population, and their aggregate GDP makes up about 40 percent of global GDP in terms of purchasing power parity, more than that of the G7, which means that the Global South is becoming a new pillar of support for growth. On the other side, and it must be noted that more than 60% of the population of these BRICS members have unimagineable levels of poverty, despite the enormous resources both human capital and natural resources. Considering this, it stands to reason that BRICS continues to attract the Global South and Global East countries that seek mutually beneficial partnerships and jointly raised the level of development and standard of living. Hopes are still rising high that after the 17th BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro on July 6-7, the Global South and Global East countries continue steadfastly to contribute to the collective efforts of BRICS association in the coming years ahead, and new leadership (with its three key strategic partnership areas: politics and security, the economy and finances, culture and the humanitarian ties) would broadly create new prospects, uphold the tenets of multilateralism and open new horizons for BRICS+ group—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
Kestér Kenn Klomegâh has a diverse work experience in the field of business intelligence and consultancy. His focused research interest includes geopolitical changes, foreign relations and economic development related questions in Africa with external countries. Klomegâh has media publications, policy monographs and e-handbooks